Canadian Military History
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 19

1993

Canadian Infantry: Besting the Best
Gil Drolet
Le College militaire royal de Saint-Jean

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh
Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
Drolet, Gil "Canadian Infantry: Besting the Best." Canadian Military History 2, 2 (1993)

This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more
information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Drolet: Canadian Infantry: Besting the Best

infantry-tank tactics." All ofthese
good things should have occurred,
but the obvious reason for the large
number of tank casualties still can
be attributed to the slow speed and
fragility of the tanks themselves.
What the tank corps most needed
in 1918 was better and more
reliable tanks. The possibilities
existed in 1918 for great success
with better technical equipment.
But lacking the equipment it is not
surprising to find that commanders
turned increasingly to more
traditional forms of warfare.
Having argued with a tiny
segment of Travers' thesis, it must
be said that this book is an
outstanding success for three
reasons. First, it is a model of
brevity and clarity. Given the
subject, and the necessity of
reviewing eighteen months of the
most concentrated fighting in the
war, I was astonished that Travers
could make his case so effectively
in 180 pages. On almost every
page, moreover, one finds a
sentence of great pungency. "Yet it
was easier to retreat, even in panic
and chaos, than it was to attack
decisively, so the fact that the
German spring offensives did not
achieve their goals was critical."
(p.107) Secondly, when I tried to
disagree with what Travers wrote,
when I tracked his research in the
notes and checked a quotation, I
found his research impeccable.
Never did he fail to acknowledge a
complication, a detail or a factor
which might have weakened his
case and in the end this
strengthened his argument. Indeed
by the end of the book the
overwhelming impression is one of
thorough research and careful
scholarship. Finally, this book
more than most, is not only a fine
piece of historical analysis, it is a
springboard for thought about
following events.

A.M.J. Hyatt is Professor and Chair,
Department of History, University
of Western Ontario. He is the author of General Sir Arthur Currie: A
Military Biography, 1987 and a
Contributing Editor to CMH.
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or this study of soldiers at
war, it would have been
difficult to pick a more
representative Canadian group
than the Fifth Canadian Infantry
Brigade, part of what insiders were
to call the "Hard-Luck Div," the
2nd Canadian Infantry Division.
Because of his extensive work on
the Maple Leaf Route series (with
Robert Vogel) and his pioneering
analysis (with Bill McAndrew) of
the devastating effects of combat
stress (Battle Exhaustion), Copp is
on familiar terrain in trying, quite
successfully as it turns out, to
restore respectability to narrative
history as an acceptable and
legitimate method of reexamining
certain contentious aspects of the
struggles of the Canadian army in
North-WestEuropefrommid-1944
to late spring 1945. With respect to
leadership, motivation and
performance, Copp, impervious to
controversy, makes effective use of
source materials (though limited
in breadth) to fly in the face of
convention and advance theories
and uncover truths that may not
be well received in certain circles
which for too long have been content
to allow the sleeping dogs of myth
to lie undisturbed. (The word "lie"
may be construed in either of its
two principal senses.)
Copp is part of what is rapidly
becoming a tradition in competent
history circles. He does not set out
deliberately to sculpt clay feet onto
idols made so in the blind heat of
patriotic fervour but using sound
research he and others (too
numerous to mention) have
reduced these epic figures to human

proportions rightly ascribing to
them more faults than qualities
when such is the case and
measuring the effects of these
shortcomings in the bloodied
columns of casualties.
Like Britain in 1914-18,
Canada had its rich crop of
mediocrities in the later war. Some
were put into positions of power
through the "old boys" network
which often proved to be
incestuously nefarious and only
rarely and fortuitously beneficial.
Fortunately, for every Foulkes
there was a Matthews but
frequently not until too high a price
had been paid. Contrary to the
tendentious contentions of TV
personalities who dabble in
hysteria, Canada is blessed with
some historians who seldom flinch
from criticizing when it is
warranted.
However, this does not
preclude their being queried when
they proffer weakly supported
beliefs. Copp, for instance, has
long believed in the mass patriotic
fervour animating the first
volunteers in 1939. In The Brigade,
he questions the belief that the
men of St. Henri (Bonheur
d'occasion; The Tin Flute) all enlist
for jobs after years on
unemployment. Roy bluntly states
that many of her people had found
"le salut dans la guerre."
Admittedly, her Emmannuel
Letourneau is an idealist concerned
for the fate of Poland, and Azari us,
crestfallen at the fall of France,
wants a piece of Hitler's mustache,
but for many, the rifle was the first
instrument of work they had had
in their hands for years. One of
Roy's denizens cynically dismisses
an indifferent democracy now
crying for help from those it had
previously abandoned. This
passage is paralleled almost exactly
in Irene Baird's Waste Heritage
where the central character speaks
in much the same way about the
country that has no use for him
and those who like him at the
moment but which will soon call on
him (and them) to dispel the
gathering clouds of war. Hugh
MacLennan puts these final words
to the tune of"The Old Grey mare"
-"there are no bums in the Jarvis
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Street Station; They're all in the
Army now." (The Watch that Ends
the Night). Perhaps the best
description of the range of reasons
for enlisting (outside Private Xavier
Gagnon's diatribe in Jean
Vaillancourt's unjustly neglected
Les Canadiens errants) is found in
Lemelin's Les Plouffe when he
refers to the countless young men
watching a religious procession in
Quebec City who "would soon join
the ranks of the 22nd or of the
Chaudieres either out of a sense of
adventure or to revive muscles
atrophied through unemployment
or out of a strange need to give of
themselves." (author's translation)
But in another area Copp has
made a significant contribution to
righting a wrongthathas persisted
for far too long. Because one of the
units in the Fifth Brigade was Le
Regiment de Maisonneuve, he has
taken a step that should have been
taken by others long ago. Largely
because of its lukewarm attitude
towards the war, French-Canada's
considerable contribution has been
falsified, neglected, or ignored by
historians and others. The reasons
vary from ignorance, through
inability or unwillingness to
communicate,
to
meanspiritedness. Legless and blind in
one eye, the recently deceased
Major Fred Tilston, probably one
of the worthiest Victoria Cross
winners in all of history, was hurt
and angered at ceremonies in a
Canadian military cemetery when
some of the veterans began to boo
when they were addressed in
French. Tilston pointed to some of
the graves amongst which these
men stood to prove theirs was not
the only language spoken by those
they were there to honour. But We
have seen books dealing with
Dieppe which relegate Les Fusiliers
Mont-Royal (FMR) to footnotes or
ignore them completely (as in the
caption on page 7 4 in the first issue
of this journal!) Atkin's Dieppe
1942 andMellor'sForgottenHeroes
refer to all the units liberating
Dieppe in 1944 which had taken

part in the 1942 raid except for the
FMRs. Were 119 killed (including
8 officers), 161 wounded and 233
prisoners not worthy of mention?
Copp, mercifully, has begun to
rectify this injustice by analyzing
the not inconsiderable effort of the
Maisies in helping to achieve
ultimate victory in Europe. By
using the unit's war diary, its
padre's excellent reminiscences
and the authority of several of the
regiment's gallant officers, the
Maisies can stand shoulder to
shoulder with their mates from the
Black Watch and Calgary
Highlanders. Their most successful
colonel, Bibeau, had led his unit
longer than any other CO in the
2nd Division. Bibeau and men like

Cantlie of the Black Watch and
Ellis of the Calgaries made it all
bearable despite the stupidities and
shortsightedness of higher
authorities. This raises the subject
of "Montgomery's Measurement,"
i.e. his evaluation of the capabilities
of various Canadian units and their
officers. His assessment of the
FMRs in January 1942 was that
most of the battalion's officers and
its CO (Grenier) were very poor.
Whether this judgement was
accurate or not, Grenier himself
was replaced on 1 April by Dollard
Menard, who as an outsider had to
prove himself to the unit, but who
in a short period of time whipped
the battalion into good shape which

may explain their being included
in the Dieppe raid of that August.
Menard, notwithstanding his
recent pronouncements, was an
inspirational leader and a worthy
predecessor to Guy Gauvreau and
Jacques Dextraze. There is no way
those who knew or fought under
P.P. Loranger, Guy Vandelac or
Bob Hainault would accept
Montgomery's verdict of "Poor." I
am tempted to ask facetiously:
"Who measured Monty?" (Jubilee?
Market Garden?)
Because Copp's first intention
was to write a regimental history
of the Calgary Highlanders, it is
only natural that The Brigade leans
more towards them but there is a
fairness and equilibrium in his
treatment of all three units and
throughout there is a solid thread
of respect and admiration for the
men in the ranks. Copp tries his
diplomatic best to walk the
tightrope created by tensions
between Brigadier Megill and
certain elements ofthe Black Watch
which have never fully forgiven
the fiasco of Verrieres Ridge and
other costly actions. Copp remains
fair to both sides yet can not avoid,
as a good historian, referring to
serious internal conflicts due to
personality
clashes
and
intransigence on the part of some
in the unit whose clannishness
denied merit when it was evident
to all but them. Such closemindedness was not particular
property of the Black Watch. All
units suffered from it at one time
or another but in some where
tradition was more rigid and
steeped in a long past which
spanned centuries and oceans, it
could be and was sometimes
coun terprod ucti ve.
There are some errors in The
Brigade which may seem innocuous
to the general reader. On page 4,
Lieutenant-Colonel Scott is
pictured wearing a colonel's badges
of rank and on the next page the
soldiers in the top photo captioned
as Calgaries are really Seaforths.
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